Extending Life Cycle Models of Optimal Portfolio Choice:
Integrating Flexible Work, Endogenous Retirement, and Investment Decisions with Lifetime Payouts
Previous research on portfolio choice and retirement patterns has evolved from three sources. First, the finance literature has investigated how investors save and allocate their portfolios across available capital market assets, typically safe bonds and risky stocks. 1 Yet most of these studies are silent on the links between labor supply and investment behavior.
Second, a large public finance literature has explored how older people alter their work patterns in response to system retirement incentives, but that research devotes little attention to saving and portfolio allocation patterns. 2 And third, the longevity risk literature has examined how annuity payout products can help protect against outliving one's income, 3 We contribute to the finance and pension literature by making the work/retirement decisions endogenous, as the consumer can adjust both her retirement date and her employment hours during her worklife. We also add value to the Social Security literature by making investment and annuitization decisions endogenous to the lifecycle work and retirement choice. From an individual's asset-liability perspective, we show how stochastic equity returns, uninsurable labor income shocks, and uncertain lifetimes help shape investment portfolio patterns.
but it has not yet explored how flexible labor supply might shape portfolio allocation and location decisions. The present paper seeks to unify these three strands in a model which integrates the decisionmaking process of a consumer seeking to optimally select her saving, consumption, work hours, retirement age, and investment patterns in a life cycle context, where she has access to both the capital market (stocks and bonds) and annuities. This is not the first analysis that makes labor supply endogenous over the life cycle in an investment context, 4 1 See for instance the seminal piece by Merton (1969) .
but we extend prior research by integrating flexible work hours and retirement ages with uncertain mortality and uninsurable labor income paths to show how they influence consumption, saving, and portfolio choice paths. Using our realistically calibrated life cycle model, we derive optimal work and retirement behavior as well as consumption and investment patterns over stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior finance studies have assumed fixed retirement ages and predict that older people hold unrealistically high levels of equity; by contrast, we show that making labor supply endogenous and allowing purchase of payout annuities reduces older persons' equity share and substantially increases work effort of the young -compatible with real-world evidence. We then illustrate how introducing annuities generates even more realistic models which permit earlier retirement and higher financial market participation by the elderly. Incorporating an agedependent leisure preference parameter is particularly interesting, as it generates a gradual decline in work hours and equity holdings with age, and a sensible dispersion in retirement ages which peak at age 62; these results are also consistent with empirical findings.
5
Our work draws on the portfolio choice, Social Security, and longevity risk management literatures. Many older finance studies assume that investors construct their portfolios independent of labor market influences, though a few authors do allow uninsurable labor income risk to shape household optimal consumption and investment decisions (Heaton and Lucas 1997; Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005) and they show how the optimal portfolio equity share falls with age due to the bond-like path of labor market earnings. Nevertheless, those authors maintain the exogeneity of labor supply. A few studies 6 A large literature in the public finance arena explores how consumption, saving, and work patterns respond to Social Security benefit incentives, but those studies do not devote much attention to portfolio investment behavior. Instead, that research takes seriously the way in which Social Security benefits depend on and/or influence retirement behavior. For instance, Laitner (2003) analyzes the effects of Social Security taxes and benefits on retirement ages, and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) offer an important empirical analysis of have embedded flexible work hours into a continuous time portfolio choice model, but they assume, unrealistically, that the worker can fully insure labor income risk in the capital market (i.e. that wages are perfectly correlated with a set of traded risky securities). A recent paper by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) analyzes endogenous work hours over the life cycle in a realistically calibrated portfolio choice discrete time model, but it requires the worker to mandatorily retire at a pre-specified age. Prohibiting consumers from controlling their retirement age is problematic, since working longer represents a key way in which older workers can react to unlucky shocks in both labor and capital markets (Mitchell and Fields 1984) . In addition, deciding when to retire and claim one's Social Security benefits is one of the most important yet irreversible financial decisions that people make. Particularly in this current bear market, households may be able to hedge adverse capital market developments by increasing their work effort and by working longer.
5 See Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) . 6 C.f. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) annuities in the portfolio choice set. To this task we turn next.
The Consumer's Life Cycle Problem

Preferences
We employ a discrete time model { } 1 ,..., 0 + ∈ T t , where t refers to the individual's adult age (computed as actual age minus 19 assuming the relevant lifespan starts at age 20).
The individual has an uncertain lifespan and may live for a maximum of T years (indexed from 1 to T). The parameter s t p denotes the (subjective) probability of surviving to period t + 1, given the consumer is alive at t. In the last period, 
over a consumption good and leisure, where the substitution between leisure and consumption takes the Cobb-Douglas form.
9
The recursive definition of the value function is given by:
7 Other studies focus on the empirical analysis of retirement patterns; see Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) and Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008) . 8 See Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009), Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006) , and Milevsky and Young (2007) ; a broad literature review appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) . 9 Low (2005) uses this same formulation but his analysis of work patterns prior to retirement is silent on portfolio choices. In sensitivity analysis below, we also evaluate the trade-off between leisure and consumption using a modified Cobb-Douglas preference function as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) .
with terminal utility
The parameter ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and β < 1 is the time preference. Here C t denotes the level of consumption and L t is leisure at time t. Leisure is measured as a percent of available time and lies in the 
where ( ) t w is a deterministic function of wage rates with respect to age allowing for the 10 In the special case where α is zero, this is consistent with the conventional utility function used in many prior studies of life cycle portfolio allocation (c.f. Campbell and Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005; Viceira 2001; and Yao and Zhang 2005) . 11 Hurd (1989) estimates the strength for intentional bequest preference to be close to zero, and therefore concludes that for most households bequest is accidential. After retirement, the household receives after-tax benefits payments from Social Security defined as follows:
and where ζ is the Social Security replacement rate based on lifetime average earnings. Here . 13 12 Our model assumes that people claim retirement benefits and move to full leisure at the same age; Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002) show that this is actually what most people do. 13 We abstract from other institutional aspects of Social Security rules such as the earnings test for retirees who return to work after retirement.
Capital and Payout Annuity Market Parameters
The individual may access capital markets by investing in two different asset classes:
riskless bonds and risky stocks. The real bond gross return is constant over time and denoted by R f . The real gross risky stock return at time t is labeled R t and evolves according to a geometric random walk with drift. This implies that the log-returns for stocks ln(R t ) are serially independent and identically normally distributed with mean µs and standard deviation σ s . The return on assets is taxed at rate t c . We also include in the investment opportunity set variable payout life annuities where the payouts may reflect an underlying portfolio of equities or bonds (or both). These are insurance contracts between an annuitant and an insurer where the purchaser pays the insurer an initial premium A t and receives a pre-specified number of fund units n t for life, conditional on survival. This is computed according to:
Here δ is an expense or loading factor charged by the insurance company to cover administrative costs, and the price of a fund unit at time t is a t Z . Also
is the cumulative conditional survival probability for an individual age 19+t to survive until age 19+s, and AIR is the assumed interest rate. The single-period survival probability a t p is specified by a mortality table used by the insurance company and may differ from the individual's subjective survival probability s t p . This allows us to model asymmetric mortality beliefs and address the problem of adverse selection in the private annuity market. The survival-contingent income from the annuity is equal to
determines how the number of fund units is supposed to change over time, according
; it may be thought of as the pre-determined shrinkage rate for the number of fund units.
The process describing the value of the fund unit is as follows:
where
is the growth rate of the asset underlying the fund, and where π a is the stock fraction chosen inside the variable annuity. The equation describing the evolution of payouts for a specific annuity may be written as: 
14 The classical annuity with lifelong fixed payouts results is a special case, whereby the portfolio inside the annuity is fully invested in bonds (i.e. π a =0) and the AIR is set equal to the riskless interest rate (i.e. 1 + AIR = R f ).
Wealth Transition and Optimization
Each period, the household decides how to allocate its cash on hand, W t , to bonds Bt, stocks St, purchase of payout annuities A t , and consumption Ct. The budget constraint becomes:
With this investment and consumption strategy, next period's wealth Wt+1 is given by:
where P t+1 is the sum of annuity payments received from all previously-purchased annuities.
Here Y t+1 , which below we call labor income, is defined in equations (2) and (3) as labor earnings prior to retirement, and Social Security benefits after retirement. The recursive evolution equation for the sum of after-tax payouts from all previous annuities purchased can be written as:
The individual's optimization problem is now to maximize the utility in (1) with respect to the appropriate asset allocation between liquid bonds and stocks, illiquid annuities, consumption, leisure, and the retirement decision:
We rule out short-selling in stocks and bonds and preclude the household from borrowing against future labor, pension, and annuity income by imposing the non-negativity restrictions 14 A more detailed discussion of how AIR influence payout profiles appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009) . 15 Here the annuities are held in a non-tax qualified account and interest earnings are taxed as capital gains at a rate below the tax rate on labor earnings but higher than the Social Security tax rate (i.e. t r < t c < t l ). This is an approximation to the exclusion ratio approach implemented by the US tax authority adopted for computational simplicity; for more detail on annuity taxation, see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (1999) and Milevsky (2006 evaluate the policy and value functions using Gaussian quadrature integration and cubicsplines interpolation.
Model Calibration
The individual's lifespan is modeled from age 20 to 100 (T = 81). In our base case, preference parameters are set to standard values in the life cycle literature, namely a coefficient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 5 and a discount factor β = 0.97. The leisure preference value α is set equal to 0.59 in the base case, which is the mean of the agedependent profile used in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) 
Results
In what follows, we present three variants of our model so as to compare key outcomes of interest including saving and investment patterns, annuitization purchases, work hours, and retirement ages. First, we develop a base case where the consumer can elect her retirement age endogenously but cannot adapt work hours per week and lacks access to annuities. Second, we allow work hours to be endogenous; and finally, we introduce annuities into the picture. To do so, we use the optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic optimization model and compute expectations using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters is provided in Section 3.
Fixed Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity
We analyze a moderately risk-averse worker (ρ=5) whose chooses her appropriate consumption, investment, and labor supply strategy given a fixed workweek (i.e. 40-hour week work) but able to select a retirement age endogenously. Figure 1 traces expected consumption, labor income, and saving patterns by age, as well as the Cobb-Douglas function of leisure and consumption
which enters the utility function. All values are normalized by the worker's first-year labor income. The results show that the household saves until age 47; liquid assets peak at age 55 in expectation when they amount to about eight times first-year labor income. Average labor income follows a hump-shaped pattern until age 65 and falls substantially when most households claim Social Security benefits at the endogenous retirement age. The consumption profile also drops sharply after age 65 and falls thereafter, since households are willing to trade off purchased goods for leisure time once this is feasible. Nevertheless, the Cobb-Douglas function F which combines consumption and leisure is quite smooth over the life cycle, as should be expected. Note that in expectation, the household would be anticipated to rationally exhaust its savings around the age of 80, relying fully on Social Security benefits after that. 
Figure 2 here
In Figure 3 we illustrate household work hours and retirement patterns. In this case, by assumption, the consumer works a 40-hour week work until retirement. As Panel A shows, labor supply patterns drop off as of the early retirement age of 62, and by age 66, all will have fully retired. Panel B displays the fraction of people electing to retire at each age: the model predicts that 14% will retire early, and the majority leaves at age 66. 
Flexible Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity
Next we allow the household to also choose its work intensity in the pre-retirement period, whereby the maximal labor supply is 2/3 of available time; in our case this is equivalent to a maximum of 75 working hours per week (i.e. 112*2/3). Results appear in Figure 4 , where we see that the household now saves much more than was true in Figure 1 .
Liquid assets now peak at earlier (at age 54 vs. 55 in Figure 1 ) and higher, amounting to over 10 times first-year labor income. On average, consumption is higher early in the work life and it falls after the normal retirement age; the function F is again smoothed over the life cycle. differences. The individual able to adjust her labor hours ends up working much more during her younger years, and then she gradually curtails labor effort after middle age. Essentially, she profits from working harder early in life, producing higher absolute saving and more capital market returns. Also, sharply different from the prior case, virtually all households work up to the normal retirement age; after that, households gradually reduce their working hours.
Overall, endogenizing both the retirement age and work hours permits the consumer to enjoy reduced hours at older ages, a pattern consistent with empirical evidence (Low 2005) . Therefore this second model generates a relative realistic labor supply pattern, though predicted high equity holdings and low capital market participation patterns still appear inconsistent with observed behavior.
Figures 5 and 6 here 2.3 Flexible Hours, Flexible Retirement, and Fixed/Variable Payout Annuities
In a third scenario, we allow the household to not only select her work intensity and retirement age, but also to hold annuities as well as stocks and bonds. Figure 4 . Now the consumer saves about 20% less at the peak of lifetime saving since she has the opportunity to purchase annuities and receive the survival credit in later life. In the fixed annuity world, the worker will gradually purchase annuities between ages 48 and 75; the buying peaks at age 62 (when she spends about 13% of first-year labor income The reason is that the illiquidity inherent in the variable annuity can be offset by flexibility in both working hours and the retirement age. Earlier purchases provide access to the survival credit and expected equity returns earlier in life.
Panels 1B and 2B of Figure 8 show the fraction of households not participating in the capital or annuity markets by age. While participation patterns by the young are virtually the same as before, there is a striking difference among the older population. Now most do not rely only on Social Security benefits; rather, they also receive income from purchased annuities. This is very clear in the case of variable annuities (2B), where virtually all retirees optimally annuitize a portion of their wealth. 
Figure 9 here
Overall, then, people retire earlier because they can secure a "second income" from their annuity purchases to supplement their Social Security benefits. In this case, endogenizing both work hours and retirement, and including annuities, the model generates hump-shaped work hour patterns, elderly equity holdings similar to those observed in the real world, and capital market participation patterns also consistent with empirical evidence.
Welfare Analysis
Next we examine the impact on consumer welfare of adding labor supply flexibility and annuities to the opportunity set. 16 To do so, we show in Table 1 Table 1 here Row (1) depicts the case of a worker who has fixed work hours but a flexible retirement age; this additional degree of freedom with respect to leisure provides a rather substantial lifetime utility gain of 4.4%. This can also be measured as a 50% gain in his first-year labor income, versus the reference case. In Row (2), the worker can adapt both her work hours and her retirement age; relative to the reference case, utility gains are even larger, at 6.6% of lifetime utility, equivalent to a 61% increase in her first-year labor income. Rows (3 and 4) permit both flexible hours and retirement ages; in the former case, only fixed annuities are available, and in the latter case, variable annuities are also available. Here we see that utility gains rise further in a world with annuities compared to Rows (1 and 2) where the annuity market is shut down; in the most flexible case, Row (4), lifetime utility rises by 7%. 16 Computational details appear in the Technical Appendix. 17 The consumption-equivalent variable in utility terms is a standard metric; we also present the worker's first year of labor income as a metric for the welfare change as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).
In sum, the marginal benefit from having access to annuities is positive and important in the life cycle context, as is labor market flexibility in the form of adjustable weekly hours of work and retirement age. We note that these increases in lifetime utility are computed from the vantage point of a 20-year old where labor market flexibility is a driver for boosting forward-looking lifetime utility. Prior research has demonstrated that, for an individual on the verge of retirement, access to annuities is similarly valuable (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown 1999; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009b) .
Sensitivity Analyses
To assess how robust our results might be to alternative formulations of household preferences, we next explore several alternative formulations of key utility parameters, namely risk aversion and the value attached to leisure. Of particular interest are the effects on labor supply, work hours, and retirement ages, summarized in Figure 10 and Table 2 . In addition, we evaluate the effects on asset allocation patterns and the likelihood of participating in the capital and annuity markets, reviewed in Tables 3 and 4 . In all instances, the benchmark (Case 1) is designed so the worker may elect flexible work hours and retirement age, and she also has access to stocks, bonds, and fixed payout annuities. Variants include Case (2) which boosts leisure preferences (to α=0.8); Case (3) reduces the consumer's risk aversion (to ρ=3); and Case (4) where risk aversion is increased (to ρ =10). In Case (5) we use a modified Cobb Douglas (MDC) utility function which alters the relative weights on consumption and leisure. Specifically, the argument of the utility function is specialized to
where α is set to 0.9 as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viciera (2008) . In Case (6) we make α agedependent to allow the utility of leisure to deteriorate with poorer health at older ages (as in Rust et al. 2000) . The leisure parameter α(t) is given by α=1-0.6/(1+t/50) where t is the period. In addition we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion to ρ=3, a value in line with the economics literature.
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Figure 10, Tables 2-3-4 here
Not surprisingly, labor supply patterns over the life cycle depend importantly on the way in which the utility function is formulated in Figure 10 . In the benchmark case of Figure   10 , the average worker starts out working over 40 hours per week and in her mid-30's she peaks at just under 50 hours per week; thereafter work hours fall gradually until retirement in her late 60's. Everyone has retired after age 68 (Table 2) . By contrast, the leisure-lover (Case 2) works only about half-time over her entire worklife and leaves employment as early as possible; all such persons are fully retired by age 63. Work hours in Case 3 and 4 are quite similar to those in the benchmark case, indicating that varying risk aversion does not much influence hours. Yet there are substantially different retirement age outcomes: the most risk averse consumer is also likely to work until forced out at age 70, whereas risk lovers have a more dispersed retirement age distribution ( Table 2 ). The pattern for Case 5 results in an unrealistically high level of work effort over the life cycle, in that young and middle-aged employees are predicted to work over 60 hours per week and must be forced to retire at age 70. Finally, Case 6 with the age-dependent utility of leisure parameter results in young persons are taking on extremely high labor hour commitments, but their effort drops off as health problems set in. Additionally they are likely to retire early, with the witdrawal pattern peaking at age 62.
The portfolio implications of this robustness analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and   4 . For instance, the leisure lovers (those who worked relatively little during their youth) also tend to invest heavily in equity until late in life (Tables 3 and 4 , Case 2). Those with lower levels of risk aversion are, not surprisingly, much more likely to invest in equity and virtually all are in the capital market even at older ages (Tables 3 and 4 , Case 3); the natural comparison is with the highly risk averse consumer in Case 4 who exits equities in favor of annuities at a much younger age. In Case 5, the asset allocation pattern seems quite reasonable: the worker starts with a high equity allocation and gradually moves into safer investments like bonds and annuities with age. We also note in Table 4 that this consumer has a high probability of participating in the financial market. Yet this seemingly realistic life cycle investment pattern stands in contrast to the unrealistically high and long worklife profile noted above, for this specification of preferences. Case 6 investment patterns are more consistent with priors, in that equity holdings are high for the young; during their 50's, the consumer is expected to switch into bonds and annuities and by age 65 to hold virtually no risky assets. But now the work patterns are more realistic than the prior case, since effort drops off with age as health deteriorates and they also retire early. In addition, the retirement peak at age 62 is also quite realistic (Table 2) . 
Conclusion
This paper uses a realistically calibrated life cycle model to derive optimal work and retirement behavior, as well as consumption and investment strategy, taking into account stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior portfolio allocation studies assume that the retirement age is set exogenously and predict that older people will hold unrealistically high levels of equity. Yet using prior studies' parameters, we show that few older persons will actually participate in the capital market at all, also incompatible with real-world evidence.
Making labor supply endogenous raises older persons' equity share and substantially increases work effort of the young; it also affords significant lifetime welfare gains of 7% or more than 60% of first-year earnings. Introducing annuities then generates even more realistic models which permit earlier retirement and higher participation by the elderly in financial markets. Finally, our model with an age-dependent leisure preference parameter fits observed behavior remarkably well, incorporating a gradual decline in work hours and equity holdings with age, as well as a sensible dispersion in retirement ages which peak at age 62, consistent with the evidence.
Evidently, combining work, investment, and lifetime payouts offers better and more attractive ways to manage life's many challenges. This is one reason that, though fixed payout annuities have been more prevalent in the marketplace to date, we anticipate investmentlinked payout annuities will become more popular as Baby Boomers age. (1) CD: α=0.59, ρ=5 (2) CD: α=0.8, ρ=5 (3) CD: α=0.59, ρ=3 (4) CD: α=0.59, ρ=10 (5) MCD: α=0.9, ρ=5 (6) CD: α: vary, ρ=3 (1) is the reference case with a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility function where α equals 0.59 and ρ is 5. Case (2) has α set at 0.8, i.e. the investor prefers to have much more leisure time. For Case (3), the investor becomes less risk-averse so ρ is 3, and more risk averse in Case (4) where ρ is 10. In Case (5) we use a modified Cobb-Douglas (MCD) with α set at 0.9 to capture a stronger leisure preference. For Case (6) we use an age-dependent α to allow for a gradual decline in the utility of leisure associated with poorer health at older ages; as in Buchinski et al. (2000) . α(t) is given by α=1-0.6/(1+t/50), where t is the period. Notes: See Figure 7 . 
